讲座题目：Signal trading with moral risk

主讲人：徐素秀博士，深圳大学管理学院特聘教授 

时间： 2019年6月25日（周二）

地点：文科楼管理学院1400  14:30-15:30 

主持人：楚湘华副教授 

内容简介：

While sellinginformation raises fascinating technological questions about data analytics andencryption, it also gives rise to moral questions about responsibility risk. Tomitigate the risk of data leakage, the seller would like to trade a signalrather than full information. A signal can be defined as a mixture of fullinformation and noise. I elaborate the design of signals and make the tradingsignal valuable for the buyer. Regarding signal trading with binarybuyer moral types, I design five kinds of menu for the seller, namely, poolingwithout (ex ante) screening, separation without screening, poolingwith partial screening, separation with partial screening, and perfectscreening. My results show that given the separation menu with both typesparticipating, the seller has to offer a strictly more valuable signal to thelow type. Notwithstanding the fact that the seller fails to send a morevaluable signal to the high type when offering two signals, the pattern ofsignal trading greatly reduces the data leakage risk relative to fullinformation selling. In this sense, ex ante screening plays a leading role indesigning optimal menu for signal trading since it lessens the probability thatthe certified buyer is a low type. I also investigate the case of continuousbuyer moral types and obtain the analytical results based on Envelop Theorem.

主讲人简介：

徐素秀，博士，暨南大学教授、博导，入选2017年广东省“珠江人才计划”青年拔尖人才。2008年毕业于哈尔滨工业大学数学系，获理学学士学位； 2014年毕业于香港大学工业及制造系统工程系，获哲学博士学位。研究方向主要包括：智能物流服务网络优化、拍卖与机制设计、及运营管理。主持多个国家及省部级项目，以第一或通讯作者发表近20篇SCI期刊论文，包括 Production andOperations Management, Transportation Science, Transportation Research Part B,IISE Transactions等。

欢迎感兴趣的师生参加！

深圳大学管理学院管理科学系