讲座题目：A Responsive Pricing Retailer Sourcing from Competing Suppliers Facing Disruption
主讲人：李涛 博士 (美国圣塔克拉拉大学利威商学院)
主持人：马利军 副教授 管理科学系副主任
We study the case of a retailer who sources from two strategic suppliers subject to independent or correlated disruptions and sets the retail price after delivery. We model this problem as a Stackelberg-Nash game with the suppliers as leaders and the retailer as a follower, and obtain explicitly the equilibrium of the game. We show that the total order quantity in equilibrium does not exceed the abundant supply, defined as a threshold above which extra units will be salvaged. We study cases in which the retailer orders from one perfectly reliable supplier and one unreliable supplier, and two correlated unreliable suppliers. In the latter case, the suppliers chosen are based on combining consideration of wholesale prices and reliabilities. We show that increasing reliability may hurt the suppliers when competition level is high. For two unreliable suppliers, it is consistent with the literature that at the equilibrium, the retailer's profit increases in the supplier disruptions correlation, but the suppliers' profits may increase in that correlation. We also show that the random disruption assumption is not a particular case of the random capacity assumption.
李涛博士在天津大学获得学士学位，在美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校获得硕士及博士学位。如今是美国圣塔克拉拉大学利威商学院运营管理和信息系统系的助理教授。他的研究兴趣主要集中在随机模型的领域，重点分析供应链中供需两端的不确定性和价格影响决策。以第一作者发表多篇SCI或SSCI国际期刊论文，期刊涵盖Production and Operations Management等。