深圳大学管理科学前沿论坛(第76期)

来源: 发布时间:2018-06-26 18:07:00 浏览量:
讲座题目:Supply Chain Contracts that Prevent Information Leakage
主讲人:Dr. Yiwei Chen(Singapore University of Technology and Design) 
时间: 2018年6月29日(周五) 
地点:管理学院资料室2423A10:00-11:30
主持人:马利军教授管理科学系副主任
 
内容简介:                        
This paper determines categories of contracts that facilitate vertical information sharing in a supply chain while precluding horizontal information leakage among competing newsvendors. We consider a supply chain in which retailers replenish inventory from a common supplier to satisfy uncertain demand and are engaged in newsvendor competition. Each retailer has imperfect demand information. Yet, one of the retailers (the incumbent) has a more accurate demand forecast than the other (the entrant). Information leakage among such competing retailers precludes vertical information sharing and is often the reason for many retailers to abandon collaborative forecast sharing initiatives, leading to sub-optimized supply chains. We show that whether a contract can prevent information leakage depends on how the inventory risk (i.e., cost of supply-demand mismatch) is distributed between the supplier and retailers in conjunction with the allocation of financial flows (i.e., sharing of pro ts). These results help us categorize contracts based on how they allocate inventory risk among firms when compared with a wholesale price contract. This comparison yields four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories of contracts. A downside-protection contract is one that effectively reduces retailers' cost of excess inventory by shifting some of their overage cost to the supplier. Examples of such contracts include buy-back and revenue-sharing contracts. An upside-protection contract is one that effectively increases retailers' cost of inventory shortage by shifting some of the supplier's underage cost to retailers. Examples of such contracts include penalty and rebate contracts. A two-sided protection contract combines the properties of the previous two categories. A no-protection contract is one that fails to shift firms' cost of inventory shortage or excess from one to the other. Examples of such contracts include wholesale-price and two-part tariff contracts. We show that no-protection contracts, which are extensively used in practice, cannot prevent information leakage whereas downside, upside or two-sided protection contracts may do so. We show how much each retailer needs to optimally order in such a competitive market and quantify the resulting supply chain profits and channel efficiency. We show that preventing information leakage could be costly for the supply chain (e.g., low channel efficiency). We also show how our unied framework to study variety of contracts can enable a firm to find and select the best performing contract (among many) that precludes information leakage while almost coordinating the channel. For example, buy-back contracts perform significantly better than revenue-sharing or rebate contracts.
 
主讲人简介:
     Dr. Yiwei Chen is an Assistant Professor at Singapore University of Technology and Design, Pillar of Engineering Systems and Design. He will be joining the University of Cincinnati, College of Business as an Assistant Professor in August 2018. Dr. Chen received his Ph.D. from MIT Sloan School of Management. His primary research interests are revenue management and pricing, and sharing economy and innovative marketplaces. His papers have been published at Management Science, Mathematics of Operations Research, Operations Research, Production and Operations Management, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological.
 
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